| ID | 018240 |
| Title Proper | Business-Government relations in Industrializing rural China: a principal-agent perspective |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kwong Charles ; Kwong, Charles |
| Publication | Nov 2000. |
| Description | 513-534 |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal–agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal–agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Contemporary China Vol: 9 No 25, Nov 2000 513-534 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Contemporary China Vol: 09 No 25 |
| Key Words | Internal Politics-China ; China-Internal Politics ; Economy-china |