| ID | 070972 |
| Title Proper | Reconsidering the effectiveness of international economic sanctions |
| Other Title Information | an examination of selection bias |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Blake, Charles H ; Klemm, Noah |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | One major concern in the study of international economic sanctions is the potential problem of selection bias. Game-theoretical analyses assert that the private suggestion of sanctions could bring about the desired change in behaviour: sanctions are least likely to be imposed when they are most likely to be effective. If this were true frequently enough, the study of sanctions implemented by states (such as in the data developed by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott [HSE]) would provide an incomplete picture of the effectiveness of the sanctions approach. In this article, we adapt Boolean analytic techniques to estimate selection bias in the HSE data. This analysis yields evidence of selection bias - suggesting that we should reconsider existing empirical research based on those data. We conclude by considering research approaches that could capture the cases lost to selection bias in the HSE data. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Politics Vol. 43, No. 1; Feb 2006: p133-149 |
| Journal Source | International Politics Vol: 43 No 1 |
| Key Words | Economic Sanctions ; Methodology ; Selection Bias |