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ID074652
Title ProperUS economic sanction threats against China
Other Title Informationfailing to leverage better human rights
LanguageENG
AuthorDrury, A Cooper ;  Li, Yitan
Publication2006.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Recent literature argues that economic sanction threats should be more successful because both sender and target have an incentive to resolve their dispute before entering into costly sanction. Testing this assertion is somewhat problematic because threats are essentially nonevents-sanctions that were never deployed. This paper quantifies the U.S. threats to condition or revoke China's most favored nation status and shows that Washington's threats were not only ineffective but also counterproductive-Chinese accommodations decreased when the U.S. made acute threats but increased when Washington was cooperative. We conclude that for highly salient issues, sanction threats tend to be ineffective.
`In' analytical NoteForeign Policy Analysis Vol. 2, No. 4; Oct 2006: p307-324
Journal SourceForeign Policy Analysis Vol: 2 No 4
Key WordsUnited States ;  China ;  Sanction Threats ;  Human Rights