| ID | 075064 |
| Title Proper | Regime design matters |
| Other Title Information | the CTBT and India's nuclear dilemma |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Saksena, Jyotika |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper argues that it was the flawed design of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) rather than the conventionally ascribed reasons of security, international status, or domestic imperatives that provided the necessary incentive for India to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 before the treaty foreclosed such an option altogether. The mandatory nature of the entry-into-force (EIF) clause of the CTBT was a departure from other international agreements in that membership was not voluntary. This suggests that any regime that impinges on a state's sovereign right to make security decisions on behalf of its people is likely to meet failure by formal or informal defections. |
| `In' analytical Note | Comparative Strategy Vol. 25, No. 3; Jul/Sep 2006: p209-229 |
| Journal Source | Comparative Strategy Vol: 25 No 3 |
| Key Words | CTBT ; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ; India ; Nuclear ; Security |