| ID | 075855 |
| Title Proper | We Can't be more Russian than the Russians |
| Other Title Information | British policy during the liman von sanders crisis, 1913-1914 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mulligan, William |
| Publication | 2006. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 17, No.2; Jun 2006: p261 - 282 |
| Journal Source | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 17, No.2; Jun 2006: p261 - 282 |
| Key Words | Russia ; Great Britain |