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ID076772
Title ProperNuclear attribution as deterrence
LanguageENG
AuthorMiller, Michael
Publication2007.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Abstract Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the nuclear weapons scientific and policymaking community. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime, or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. Developing a nuclear fingerprint database is also discussed. While useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.
`In' analytical NoteNonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.1; Mar 2007: p33-59
Journal SourceNonproliferation Review Vol. 14, No.1; Mar 2007: p33-59
Key WordsNuclear Weapon ;  Nuclear Forensics ;  Nuclear Attribution ;  Deterrence ;  Terrorism ;  Uranium ;  Plutonium


 
 
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