| ID | 085312 |
| Title Proper | Not complements, but substitutes |
| Other Title Information | fixed exchange rate commitments, central bank independence, and external currency stability |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bearce, David H |
| Publication | 2008. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper explores whether fixed exchange rate commitments and central bank independence have functioned more as institutional complements or as substitutes in achieving exchange rate stability. Focusing on the advanced industrial democracies in the post-Bretton Woods era, it argues that these two monetary institutions should have functioned in a non-complementary, but substitutable, manner with regards to this external policy goal. This argument is tested statistically using different measures of exchange rate variability and de facto exchange rate fixity. Finally, given evidence that fixed exchange rate commitments and central bank independence have not functioned as complementary institutions, this paper discusses why certain OECD (governments that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) governments nonetheless made fixed exchange rate commitments when their central bank was legally independent. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 4; Dec 2008: p807 - 824 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, No. 4; Dec 2008: p807 - 824 |
| Key Words | Exchange Rate ; Central Bank ; Currency Stability |