| ID | 087372 |
| Title Proper | Gaza, Israel, hamas and the lost calm of operation cast lead |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zuhur, Sherifa |
| Publication | 2009. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | aspect of the
Palestinian experience has been easy or
well communicated to the global public,
but it does seem that post-9/11 Western
discourse on Arabs and Muslims has led to
particularly biased reporting of the confl ict,
a glib assumption by major networks that
their American viewers see the world just
as Benjamin Netanyahu or Michael Oren
do. Comprehensive reportage was really
impossible; the Israelis barred journalists
from Gaza, and the wildest sorts of allegations
are being made. Still, we have an
idea of the human impact: more than 1,300
Palestinians have been killed and more
than 5,300 wounded, compared to thirteen
Israeli deaths (some by friendly fi re), as of
January 18, 2008. The "why" of this latest
adventure is harder to fathom, unless Israel
truly desires to remain in a state of confl
ict, and for that confl ict to worsen. This
ought to be given serious consideration; it
is not for nothing that Israel has become
an exporter of weapons, security systems
and "security training." Moreover, most
Israelis remain physically segregated from
Palestinian suffering and many maintain
a comfortable and secure lifestyle that
may not be much of an incentive to peace.
Others live far less comfortably, travel by
public transport but lack any sympathy for
Palestinians, not only due to their separation
from or ignorance of them, but due to
fear, enlarged by the media.
Declarations like "Hamas has to be
taught a lesson" belie the fact that Hamas
is a movement located throughout the
Palestinian national body, just as Hizbollah
represents large numbers of Shii Muslims
in Lebanon, and as an accepted political
party, cannot be easily extricated from the
nation. Most curious are Tzipi Livni's declarations
of "success," which were implicitly,
if subtly, challenged by Fareed Zakaria
and others who have questioned the real
military intent of reconquering Gaza. If by
"successful" Livni means that there will be
an end to Hamas, she is wrong. To claim
that the goal is to reduce the numbers of
rockets (which have killed very few Israelis)
fi red into southern Israel from Gaza
since long before Hamas actually assumed
political control of that area, is also clearly
nonsense. That is not the goal of a mas- |
| `In' analytical Note | Middle East Policy Vol. 16, No. 1; Spring 2009: p40-52 |
| Journal Source | Middle East Policy Vol. 16, No. 1; Spring 2009: p40-52 |
| Key Words | Gaza ; Israel ; Hamas ; Lost Calm of Operation Cast Lead |