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ID089033
Title ProperBreaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations
Other Title Informationthe WTO, Seattle, and Doha
LanguageENG
AuthorOdell, John S
Publication2009.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Negotiations among members of international institutions often stalemate yet the outcomes vary. Sometimes talks end in impasse and other times in agreement. Several familiar theories are unable to explain the contrast between two prominent outcomes in the World Trade Organization-its 1999 deadlock in Seattle and its 2001 agreement in Doha, Qatar, on an agenda for a new round. Extensive original evidence from these cases documents mechanisms that can tip the negotiation process between impasse and agreement in any institution, not only economic ones. The study illustrates benefits for international relations research of building on the relatively neglected tradition of negotiation analysis, a substantial part of which is outside political science.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Studies Quarterly Vol. 53, No. 2; Jun 2009: p. 273-299
Journal SourceInternational Studies Quarterly Vol. 53, No. 2; Jun 2009: p. 273-299
Key WordsBreaking Deadlocks ;  International Institutional Negotiations ;  WTO ;  Seattle ;  Doha ;  Political Science


 
 
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