| ID | 094739 |
| Title Proper | Terrorist spectaculars |
| Other Title Information | Backlash attacks and the focus of intelligence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Arce, Daniel G ; Sandler, Todd |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government's counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for ''spectacular'' terrorist attacks is inversely related to the government's toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 2; Apr 2010: p.354-373 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 2; Apr 2010: p.354-373 |
| Key Words | Signaling Games ; Terrorist Spectaculars ; Value of Intelligence ; Backlash Attacks ; Counterterrorism |