| ID | 096560 |
| Title Proper | Legislative constraints |
| Other Title Information | a path to peace? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Choi, Seung-Whan |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Tsebelis' veto players theory predicts that legislative veto players constrain the executive's political decisions because their approval is needed to implement policy change. This study extends the veto players argument into international conflict literature, specifically in regard to legislative constraints emanating from the number of legislative veto players, their policy preferences, and their internal cohesion. A cross-sectional, time-series dyadic data analysis shows that, in general, an increase of legislative constraints notably reduces the likelihood of the onset of militarized interstate disputes. However, while legislative constraints in democratic and mixed dyads are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force, those in autocratic dyads do not produce effective pacifying effects. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 3; Jun 2010: p.438-470 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 54, No. 3; Jun 2010: p.438-470 |
| Key Words | International Conflict Literature ; Legislative Veto Players ; Militarized Interstate Disputes |