| ID | 097779 |
| Title Proper | Impossible challenge of deterring nuclear terrorism by Al Qaeda |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Velde, James R Van De |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for "deterrence based on punishment" have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons-employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of "crisis instability" ("use it or lose it"): should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction-Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies. |
| `In' analytical Note | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 8; Aug 2010: p.682 - 699 |
| Journal Source | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 8; Aug 2010: p.682 - 699 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Terrorism ; Al Qaeda ; Nuclear Weapon ; Nuclear Terrorism Defense |