| ID | 098697 |
| Title Proper | Program evaluation and incentives for administrators of energy-efficiency programs |
| Other Title Information | Can evaluation solve the principal/agent problem |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Blumstein, Carl |
| Publication | 2010. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper addresses the nexus between evaluation of energy-efficiency programs and incentive payments based on performance for program administrators in California. The paper describes the problems that arise when evaluators are asked to measure program performance by answering the counterfactual question-what would have happened in the absence of the program? Then the paper examines some ways of addressing these problems. Key conclusions are (1) program evaluation cannot precisely and accurately determine the counterfactual, there will always be substantial uncertainty, (2) given the current state of knowledge, the decision to tie all incentives to program outcomes is misguided, and (3) incentive programs should be regularly reviewed and revised so that they can be adapted to new conditions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy Vol. 38, No. 10; Oct 2010: p6232-6239 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy Vol. 38, No. 10; Oct 2010: p6232-6239 |
| Key Words | Energy-efficiency ; Incentives ; Principal/agent |