| ID | 102369 |
| Title Proper | Visions of the enemy from the field and from abroad |
| Other Title Information | revisiting CIA and military expectations of the tet offensive |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Ovodenko, Alexander |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As the January 1968 Tet holiday approached, CIA analysts and American commanders in South Vietnam developed more accurate conclusions about communist military strategy than did intelligence analysts at CIA headquarters. Besides valuing different types of intelligence, General William Westmoreland, Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, and CIA analysts in Saigon also placed greater emphasis on new information about communist military strategy than did CIA analysts at Langley. These different reactions to information highlight reasons why military commanders and intelligence analysts stationed in the theater of operations might develop more accurate conclusions about enemy military strategy than intelligence analysts stationed at their national headquarters. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 34, No. 1; Feb 2011: p.119 - 144 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 34, No. 1; Feb 2011: p.119 - 144 |
| Key Words | South Vietnam ; CIA ; Communist Military Strategy ; Intelligence Analysts ; Vietnam ; United States |