ID | 103865 |
Title Proper | Social policy by popular demand |
Language | ENG |
Author | Rehm, Philipp |
Publication | 2011. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why are unemployment benefits more generous in some countries? This article argues that citizens trade off the redistributive and insuring effect of social insurance. As a result, the distribution of risk in a society has important consequences via popular demand for social policy-making. At the microlevel, the article shows that, in addition to income, the risk of unemployment is a key predictor of individual-level preferences for unemployment benefits. Based on the microlevel findings, the article argues that at the macrolevel the homogeneity of the risk pool is an important determinant of benefit generosity: the more equally unemployment risk is distributed, the higher unemployment replacement rates are. Empirical testing at both levels finds support for this account of social policy by popular demand. |
`In' analytical Note | World Politics Vol. 62, No. 2; Apr 2011: p271-299 |
Journal Source | World Politics Vol. 62, No. 2; Apr 2011: p271-299 |
Key Words | Social Policy ; Democracy System ; Literature ; Citizens Trade |