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ID103892
Title ProperEffect of repeated play on reputation building
Other Title Informationan experimental approach
LanguageENG
AuthorTingley, Dustin H ;  Walter, Barbara F
Publication2011.
Summary / Abstract (Note)What effect does repeated play have on reputation building? The literature on international relations remains divided on whether, when, and how reputation matters in both interstate and intrastate conflict. We examine reputation building through a series of incentivized laboratory experiments. Using comparative statics from a repeated entry-deterrence game, we isolate how incentives for reputation building should change as the number of entrants changes. We find that subjects in our experiments generally build reputations and that those investments pay off, but we also find that some subjects did not react to incentives to build reputation in ways our model had predicted. In order to explain this, we focus on the heterogeneity of preferences and cognitive abilities that may exist in any population. Our research suggests that rational-choice scholars of international relations and those using more psychologically based explanations have more common ground than previously articulated.
`In' analytical NoteInternational Organization Vol. 65, No. 2; Spring 2011: p. 343-365
Journal SourceInternational Organization Vol. 65, No. 2; Spring 2011: p. 343-365
Key WordsReputation Building ;  Experimental Approach ;  International Relations


 
 
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