| ID | 105164 |
| Title Proper | Proportionality and international humanitarian law |
| Other Title Information | an economic analysis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Horvitz, Sigmund A ; Nehs, Robert M |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Article 57, mandates the rule of proportionality governing military attacks. The literature on international humanitarian law, however, reflects a widely-held view that this mandate is often ignored. Motivated by that view, this paper discusses three strategies, which, by appealing to ubiquitous social values, can encourage respect for and, in turn, compliance with the proportionality rule. These strategies are: first, interpreting a proportional attack as one which requires a rational and equitable balance, in cost-benefit terms, of the conflicting military and humanitarian interests, respectively, of the attacking and the attacked Parties (without sacrificing the desired military advantage of the former); second, requiring a planned attack to be 'objectively proportional', as measured by the preferences, quantified in statistical terms, of the 'reasonable military commander'; and, third, requiring the attacking Party to compensate victims for incidental civilian damage resulting from an attack that is not objectively proportional. Observance of the principle of proportionality depends upon voluntary compliance, induced by respect for this principle, since compliance is not compelled under current international law. |
| `In' analytical Note | Global Change Peace and Security Vol. 23, No. 2; Jun 2011: p195-206 |
| Journal Source | Global Change Peace and Security Vol. 23, No. 2; Jun 2011: p195-206 |
| Key Words | Proportionality ; International Humanitarian Law ; Economic Analysis |