ID | 105223 |
Title Proper | Explaining central intervention in local extra-budgetary practices in China |
Language | ENG |
Author | Zhan, Jing Vivian |
Publication | 2011. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | Chinese local governments widely resort to extra-budgetary exaction to finance themselves, which generates side effects that necessitate central intervention. Through statistical analysis, this paper finds that the central government intervenes only selectively, following a logic driven by economic development and political stability. |
`In' analytical Note | Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 3; May-Jun 2011: p497-519 |
Journal Source | Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 3; May-Jun 2011: p497-519 |
Key Words | China ; Central-local Relations ; Data Analysis ; Extra-budgetary Finance ; Principal-agent Problem |