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ID106046
Title ProperWinning friends and influencing enemies among great power rivals
Other Title InformationThe Case of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, 1969-1979
LanguageENG
AuthorLobell, Steven E
Publication2011.
Summary / Abstract (Note)eginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States discussed or extended capital and technology, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff treatment, Export-Import Bank financing, and long-term credit to the Soviet Union and China. This strategy raises three questions: First, why did the United States extend concessions to rival great powers when, under the more restrictive international environment of the 1970, it viewed Moscow's growing aggregate economic power and military capability, and especially its emerging nuclear strategic parity in ICBMs, and China's ideological challenge to the West as threats? 1 Second, why, under this restrictive environment, did U.S. engagement with China and the Soviet Union make greater advances, resulting in major treaties on arms control such as the SALT Agreements, Basic Principals Agreement, Helsinki Agreement, and Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the normalization of Sino-American relations, than in previous periods? Third, and a point scholars often neglect, what role did Beijing and Moscow play in guiding American foreign policy towards China and the Soviet Union?
`In' analytical NoteChinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 4, No. 2; Sum 2011: p205-230
Journal SourceChinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 4, No. 2; Sum 2011: p205-230
Key WordsRival ;  Moscow ;  MFN ;  Most Favored Nation ;  America ;  China


 
 
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