| ID | 108528 |
| Title Proper | Planning for the unthinkable |
| Other Title Information | countering a North Korean nuclear attack and management of post-attack scenarios |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Bechtol, Bruce E |
| Publication | 2011. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | North Korea has shown no willingness to give up its nuclear weaponization programs. In fact, Pyongyang has gone out of its way to keep essential elements of its
nuclear programs hidden unless it was in the DPRK's interest to publicly display
them. With the increase in tensions initiated by North Korea in recent years this is
particularly disturbing. A review of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities
reveals a two-track agenda consisting of both a plutonium (proven) and a highly
enriched uranium (likely) program. Scenarios involving both of these programs
show that North Korea-despite rather primitive capabilities-can deliver a nuclear
weapon that would cause casualties in the tens of thousands. While a preemptive
strike may seem like the obvious answer to a nuclear attack, North Korea's ability
to strike back with non-nuclear forces would likely mean a full-scale conflict possibly involving hundreds of thousands of casualties. Consequence management
for a nuclear attack would be unable to prevent second- and third-order effects
that could last as long as a generation. High-level officials in Washington and
Seoul have placed renewed focus on planning for nuclear scenarios on the Korean
peninsula-but the bottom line is that preventing and deterring a North Korean
nuclear attack must be a high priority. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 23, No. 1; Mar 2011: p.1-17 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 23, No. 1; Mar 2011: p.1-17 |
| Key Words | North Korea ; North Korean Nuclear Attack ; Nuclear Weaponization programs ; Pyongyang ; Washington ; Seoul ; Korean Peninsula ; North Korea |