| ID | 113545 |
| Title Proper | Dynamic government performance |
| Other Title Information | honeymoons and crises of confidence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dewan, Torun ; Myatt, David P |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government's longevity and its performance. Ministers perform well when their careers are valuable; this is so when the government's duration is expected to be long; the government's survival depends on its popularity; and, finally, that popularity depends on its ministers' performance. The feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational-expectations equilibria can arise: Ministers work hard for a popular government, but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed; these alternatives are both self-fulfilling prophecies. However, the presence of (perhaps small) random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium. We explore the dynamics that arise: A crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government's performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.1; Feb 2012: p.123-145 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No.1; Feb 2012: p.123-145 |
| Key Words | Dynamic Government Performance ; Honeymoons ; Crises of Confidence |