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ID115098
Title ProperShoring up Iraq, 1983 to 1990
Other Title InformationWashington and the chemical weapons controversy
LanguageENG
AuthorFredman, Zach
Publication2012.
Summary / Abstract (Note)President Ronald Reagan's White House leaned toward Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War because it sought to prevent an Iraqi defeat. Though the White House deemed Iraqi chemical weapons use abhorrent, it found the implications of an Iranian victory or expanded Soviet influence in the Middle East far more alarming. Newly released documents from the Iraqi state archives now allow an exploration of the chemical weapons controversy from both Iraqi and American perspectives. This evidence, along with sources from American archives, demonstrates that Washington and Baghdad had radically different assessments of the Iran-Iraq War. American officials hoped to mould Iraq into a useful ally, but Saddam interpreted American support as subterfuge. Saddam's hostile view of American intentions indicates that Washington had less influence over Iraqi behaviour during the 1980s than both contemporary American officials and many scholars writing since have realised. To insist that Washington could have deterred Iraqi chemical weapons use overstates American clout.
`In' analytical NoteDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 23, No.3; Sep 2012: p.533-554
Journal SourceDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 23, No.3; Sep 2012: p.533-554
Key WordsRonald Reagan ;  White House ;  Iran - Iraq War ;  Iraqi Chemical Weapons ;  Baghdad ;  Iran – Iraq War