| ID | 115300 |
| Title Proper | Geography of nuclear proliferation networks |
| Other Title Information | the case of A Q Khan |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Hastings, Justin V |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article uses a geographic approach to examine one aspect of the nuclear black market: the coordinators who bring buyers and sellers together, and transport goods between them. The most important factor in determining the geographical structure of a proliferation network is the network coordinator's access (or lack thereof) to unique state resources. Coordinators with access to state resources and prerogatives can avoid embedding themselves in hostile countries or relying on commercial infrastructure, often leading to territorially diffuse logistical networks. Coordinators without such access are forced to rely on commercial infrastructure and favorable local political, economic, and social conditions, often resulting in territorially centralized logistical networks. This is illustrated through case studies of Abdul Qadeer Khan's supply networks to Pakistan, Libya, and Iran. The article concludes with some observations about the implications of a geographical approach for understanding nuclear proliferation networks. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 19, No.3; Nov 2012: p.429-450 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 19, No.3; Nov 2012: p.429-450 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Proliferation ; Black Market ; A Q Khan ; Pakistan ; Libya ; Iran |