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ID116258
Title ProperNasty not nice
Other Title InformationBritish counter-insurgency doctrine and practice, 1945-1967
LanguageENG
AuthorFrench, David
Publication2012.
Summary / Abstract (Note)At the beginning of the twenty-first century the British Ministry of Defence prided itself that it was the Western world's leader in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Drawing on the lessons it had learnt during Britain's wars of decolonisation, it believed that it had discovered ways of waging wars among the people that enabled it to use force effectively but with discrimination, distinguishing between the 'guilty' few and the 'innocent' many. This article will survey these assertions in the light of historical evidence drawn from 10 of those campaigns: Palestine, Malaya, the Suez Canal Zone, Kenya, British Guiana, Cyprus, Oman, Nyasaland, Borneo, and Aden. It will suggest that the real foundation of British counter-insurgency doctrine and practice was not the quest to win 'hearts and minds'. It was the application of wholesale coercion.
`In' analytical NoteSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.4-5; Oct-Dec 2012: p.744-761
Journal SourceSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 23, No.4-5; Oct-Dec 2012: p.744-761
Key WordsWars of Decolonisation ;  Counter - Insurgency ;  British Army ;  Hearts and Minds ;  Colonial Emergencies


 
 
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