| ID | 116297 |
| Title Proper | Turkish nuclear security after Iranian nuclearization |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Guney, Nursin Atesoglu |
| Publication | 2012. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | If the international community cannot dissuade Iran from becoming either a nuclear threshold country or an explicit nuclear power, then the manner in which deterrence is extended is of utmost importance to Turkish security. Turkish security will ultimately be damaged by Iranian attempts to acquire a nuclear bomb. The credibility of extended deterrence will surely be the key factor in averting regional decisions to opt for nuclear status in the face of a likely threshold nuclear Tehran. Current proposals regarding missile defence and precision guided weapons as optimum tools of deterrence fall short as alternatives compared with a credible reliable nuclear deterrence. So as long as NATO maintains a credible mix of nuclear and conventional means of deterrence, and guarantees allied security via strengthened extended assurance, Turkey will be comfortable when confronted with new nuclear states in its region. Ankara's likely response is expected to favour strengthening security relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and seeking to bolster the American/NATO security guarantee, rather than decoupling from the alliance. As long as American/NATO extended deterrence is adapted to the new conditions and continuity is assured, a Turkish decision to decouple from the Western alliance or opt for its own individual nuclear capability remains only a distant possibility. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 33, No.3; Dec 2012: p.512-529 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 33, No.3; Dec 2012: p.512-529 |
| Key Words | International Community ; Turkish Security ; Turkey ; New Nuclear States ; NATO ; America ; Iranian Nuclearization ; United States |