ID | 117023 |
Title Proper | Obama and Iran |
Language | ENG |
Author | Hurst, Steven |
Publication | 2012. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | President Barack Obama's choice of toughened sanctions as the means to prevent Iran achieving nuclear weapons status is discussed. It is argued that that choice is explained less by any belief in their likely effectiveness than by the unattractive and risky nature of the alternatives. The use of force would not eliminate Iran's nuclear programme and risks pitching the region into even deeper turmoil; the 'Grand Bargain' with Iran advocated by others would alienate allies and domestic interests and undermine the administration's wider objectives in the Middle East. The attraction of sanctions, in contrast, is that though unlikely to work they pose little threat to US interests while allowing the Obama administration to stave off demands to adopt high risk alternatives and creating a breathing space for the administration to consider the future evolution of its Iran policy. |
`In' analytical Note | International Politics Vol. 49, No.5; Sep 2012: p.545-567 |
Journal Source | International Politics Vol. 49, No.5; Sep 2012: p.545-567 |
Key Words | Iran ; United States ; Sanctions ; Nuclear ; Obama |