| ID | 119251 |
| Title Proper | Cooperative ballistic missile defence for America, China, and Russia |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Steff, Reuben |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Consensus amongst great powers on ballistic missile defence (BMD) may be the only way to ensure it does not undermine international security. This article applies defensive realism to explain the destabilizing effect of America's unilateral deployment of BMD. Under defensive realism, states opting for offensive strategies are punished, cooperation and reconciliation becoming more logical strategic options. The reversal of previous American policy under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty created a new security dilemma with China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are not opposed to BMD in principle, though, and defensive realism provides a basis for improving relations, stressing joint deployment of BMD as the basis for a new paradigm of strategic relations. Defensive realism supports the conclusion that consensus amongst great powers on BMD is essential to strategic stability. It shows that the most likely alternative is worsening strategic action-reaction dynamics with unpredictable consequences. If BMD cooperation expands, however, domestic opposition will coalesce from groups with an interest in great power competition. Subsequent analysis should examine in more detail the role these groups play in influencing security policy and how they impede, or could facilitate, the emergence of BMD cooperation. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 34, No.1; Apr 2013: p.94-119 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 34, No.1; Apr 2013: p.94-119 |
| Key Words | Ballistic Missile ; Defensive Realism ; Anti - Ballistic Missile ; New Security Dilemma ; China ; Russia |