| ID | 120282 |
| Title Proper | Egyptian army and Egypt's spring |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Frisch, Hillel |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | After Mubarak's ouster, the Egyptian senior command had assumed a guardian role similar to the former Turkish model despite a shoddy performance in maintaining public order and the questionable loyalty of the lower ranked officers and the ordinary soldiers. Its relative success in managing the transition was due to the willingness of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists to negotiate as stakeholders in the system rather than to battle in the streets against the Army. The Muslim Brotherhood strategy worked. In August 2012, recently elected president Morsi subordinated the military by removing the veteran Minister of Defence, the Chief-of-Staff, and other key officers. The military caved in without a whimper. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 36, No. 2; Apr 2013: p. 180 - 204 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 36, No. 2; Apr 2013: p. 180 - 204 |
| Key Words | Egypt ; Army ; Arab Spring ; Political Transition ; SCAF ; Muslim Brotherhood ; Morsi ; Mubarak ; Public Violence |