| ID | 122589 |
| Title Proper | Petroleum pitfalls |
| Other Title Information | the United States, Argentine nationalism, and the 1963 oil crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Walcher, Dustin |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Petroleum Pitfalls" examines the U.S. response to the 1963 Argentine oil crisis. Newly elected Argentine President Arturo Illia cancelled oil exploration and drilling contracts held by private, predominately U.S. corporations, by executive decree on 16 November 1963. Kennedy administration officials had worked with oil executives in an unsuccessful attempt to convince Illia not to issue the decree. In Argentina, the oil crisis both emerged from and enflamed economic nationalism. In the United States it helped dampen political support for foreign aid generally, and prompted strict modifications to the Hickenlooper amendment specifically. In the end, the crisis poisoned the U.S.-Argentine relationship. Foreshadowing the Mann Doctrine, Ambassador Robert McClintock advocated enhancing support for Argentine military officers whose aims were thought to align with U.S. political and economic objectives. In a larger sense, official U.S. promotion of oil interests in Argentina demonstrates significant continuities in U.S. policy between the first decades of the twentieth century and the Cold War era. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomatic History Vol. 37, No.1; Jan 2013: p.24-57 |
| Journal Source | Diplomatic History Vol. 37, No.1; Jan 2013: p.24-57 |
| Key Words | Petroleum Pitfalls ; United States ; Argentine Oil Crisis ; Arturo Illia ; Argentina ; Economic Nationalism ; Foreign Aid ; Argentine Military Forces |