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ID123295
Title ProperEvaluating CIA's analytic performance
Other Title Informationreflections of a former analyst
LanguageENG
AuthorMarrin, Stephen
Publication2013.
Summary / Abstract (Note)Many people point to high profile failures like 9/11 and Iraq as indicators that CIA's analytic performance is inadequate or flawed. Flawed by design.1 A legacy of ashes.2 A culture of failure.3 Or so goes the conventional wisdom. Fortunately this conventional wisdom is wrong. These so-called failures more accurately represent the perennial dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with the analytic function and, most importantly, the inappropriate expectation that these observers hold of CIA's ability to prevent surprises. As a matter of fact, there is much that people do not fully understand about the CIA.
`In' analytical NoteOrbis Vol. 57, No.2; Spring 2013: p.325-339
Journal SourceOrbis Vol. 57, No.2; Spring 2013: p.325-339
Key Words9/11 ;  CIA ;  Conventional Wisdom ;  CIA's Analytic Performance