| ID | 124341 |
| Title Proper | From assured defeat to 'the riddle of soviet military success' |
| Other Title Information | Anglo-American government assessments of Soviet war potential 1941-1943 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kahn, Martin |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | At the beginning of the Soviet-German war in June 1941 most Anglo-American Government officials believed in a swift collapse of Soviet resistance. When the collapse did not materialize assessments gradually changed and a more realistic outlook on Soviet war potential was eventually produced. But it was not until the late summer of 1943 that the Anglo-Americans finally believed in a more sustained Red Army offensive effort against the Germans, and even then US observers still underestimated Soviet strength. During the whole period 1941-1943 British observers generally had a relatively more realistic apprehension of Soviet capabilities. The Anglo-American perceptions and the change in perceptions, considering the whole context of World War II, had implications for the Western Allied war effort. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol.26, No.3; 2013: p.462-489 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol.26, No.3; 2013: p.462-489 |
| Key Words | Riddle ; World War -II ; Warfare ; War Techniques ; Soviet Russia ; Anglo-America ; Germany ; Hitler ; Red Army ; US Observers ; British Observers ; German-Russian War ; War Conditions ; Soviet Resistance ; Soviet War Potential - 1941-43 ; War Efforts |