| ID | 126445 |
| Title Proper | Coming together |
| Other Title Information | power-sharing and the durability of negotiated peace settlements |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Martin, Philip |
| Publication | 2013. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article investigates the relationship between power-sharing institutions and the durability of peace after negotiated settlements, employing statistical analyses on a large N data-set of peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2008. In contrast to recent studies which rely on a singular measure of 'political' power-sharing, post-settlement government institutions are empirically evaluated in terms of five key dimensions - executive-level coalitions, legislative proportionality, minority veto powers, military pacts and territorial decentralization. Contrary to the prevalent view that elite power-sharing pacts are key components for stability, the hazard-rate models reveal that executive power-sharing is a particularly unstable form of post-conflict governance. Instead, institutional options that separate belligerent parties and preserve their autonomy, such as territorial power-sharing and proportionality in the military forces, are the most significant predictors of settlement success. It is postulated that executive-level power-sharing is ineffective for stabilizing peace because disputants without genuine intentions of cooperation can enter these coalitions at a low cost. |
| `In' analytical Note | Civil Wars Vol. 15, No.3; Sep 2013: p.332-358 |
| Journal Source | Civil Wars Vol. 15, No.3; Sep 2013: p.332-358 |
| Key Words | Power - Sharing ; Durability of Negotiated Peace Settlements ; Minority Veto Powers ; Legislative Proportionality |