ID | 128969 |
Title Proper | Partisan heterogeneity and international cooperation |
Other Title Information | the case of the European development fund |
Language | ENG |
Author | Schneider, Christina J ; Urpelainen, Johannes |
Publication | 2014. |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments' willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments' financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments' incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation. |
`In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.58, No.1; February 2014: p.120-142 |
Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.58, No.1; February 2014: p.120-142 |
Key Words | Domestic Politics ; Partisan Heterogeneity ; International Cooperation ; European Union - EU ; European Development Fund -EDF ; European Cooperation ; International Organizations - IO ; International Relations - IR ; Persia ; Iran ; Middle East ; Intergovernmental Negotiations ; Financial Contributions ; International Development |