| ID | 130356 |
| Title Proper | Arms control after the Ukraine crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kimball, Daryl G |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The Global Nuclear Disarmament and risk reduction enterprise is at a crossroads as U.S.-Russian relations have reached perhaps their lowest point in more than a quarter century. Nevertheless, it remains in U.S. and Russian interests to implement existing nuclear risk reduction agreements and pursue practical, low-risk steps to lower tensions. Present circumstances demand new approaches to resolve stubborn challenges to deeper nuclear cuts and the establishment of a new framework to address Euro-Atlantic security issues.
Even before the recent political turmoil in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin's extralegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, relations between Moscow and Washington were chilly. Despite U.S. adjustments to its missile defense plans in Europe that eliminate any threat to Russian strategic missiles, Putin rebuffed U.S. President Barack Obama's proposal last June to reduce U.S. and Russian strategic stockpiles by one-third below the ceilings set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
Moving forward will be difficult, but doing nothing is not an option. Through earlier crises during and after the Cold War, U.S. and Russian leaders pursued effective arms control and disarmament initiatives that increased mutual security and significantly reduced the nuclear danger. Much has been achieved, albeit too slowly, but there is far more to be done.
As the world's non-nuclear-weapon states persuasively argue, U.S. and Russian stockpiles still far exceed any plausible deterrence requirements, and the use of just a few nuclear weapons by any country would have catastrophic global consequences. As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference approaches, pressure to accelerate action on disarmament will only grow.
For now, neither Russia nor the United States wants to scrap the existing arms control regime, including New START and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which provide greater predictability and stability in an otherwise strained bilateral relationship. A return to a period of unconstrained strategic nuclear competition would not only deepen the distrust and increase dangers for both sides, but also would undermine the NPT. Scrapping the existing nuclear risk reduction measures would do nothing to protect Ukraine from further Russian aggression or reassure nervous NATO allies.
Unfortunately, the profound tensions over Ukraine delay the possibility of any formal, bilateral talks on nuclear arms reductions and missile defense. In light of these realities, Obama and other key leaders must explore alternative options to reduce global nuclear dangers and defuse U.S.-Russian strategic tensions. |
| `In' analytical Note | Arms Control Today Vol.44, No.3; April 2014: p.3 |
| Journal Source | Arms Control Today Vol.44, No.3; April 2014: p.3 |
| Key Words | Global Politics ; Ukraine ; Ukraine Crisis ; Crimea Crisis ; Crimean Peninsula ; Political Future ; Soviet Union ; United States ; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - SART ; United Kingdom ; Canada ; Italy ; France ; Germany ; Japan ; Weapon Crisis ; International Organization ; Mass Destruction of Weapons - MDS ; International Crisis ; Russian - China Relations ; G8- Association ; European Union - EU ; NATO ; Global Partnership ; Global Nuclear Disarmament ; Bilateral Talks ; Bilateral Relationship ; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces - INF |