| ID | 131112 |
| Title Proper | Nonproliferation emperor has no clothes |
| Other Title Information | the gas centrifuge, supply-side controls, and the future of nuclear proliferation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kemp, R Scott |
| Publication | 2014. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Technology has been long understood to play a central role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Evolving nuclear technology, increased access to information, and systematic improvements in design and manufacturing tools, however, should in time ease the proliferation challenge. Eventually, even developing countries could possess a sufficient technical ability. There is evidence that this transition has already occurred. The basic uranium-enrichment gas centrifuge, developed in the 1960s, has technical characteristics that are within reach of nearly all states, without foreign assistance or access to export-controllable materials. The history of centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective, as do previously secret studies carried out by the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. Complicating matters, centrifuges also have properties that make the detection of a clandestine program enormously difficult. If conditions for the clandestine and indigenous production of weapons have emerged, then nonproliferation institutions focused on technology will be inadequate. Although it would represent a near-foundational shift in nuclear security policy, the changed technology landscape may now necessitate a return to institutions focused instead on motivations. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 38, No.4; Spring 2014: p.39-78 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol. 38, No.4; Spring 2014: p.39-78 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Nuclear Technology ; United States ; United Kingdom ; Future of Nuclear Proliferation ; Gas Centrifuge |