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ID132280
Title ProperDeterrence and overseas stability
LanguageENG
AuthorStone, John
Publication2014.
Summary / Abstract (Note)The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.
`In' analytical NoteSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol.25, No.3; Jun.2014: p.669-684
Journal SourceSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol.25, No.3; Jun.2014: p.669-684
Key WordsDeterrence ;  Stabilization ;  Conventional Forces ;  International Terrorism ;  Terrorist Attack ;  Cold War ;  Overseas Strategy ;  Building Stability Overseas Strategy ;  Conventional Deterrence ;  Tailored Deterrence ;  Military ;  NATO