| ID | 136898 |
| Title Proper | Lessons learned from the LCS |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cox, Gregory V |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | As the Navy modifies its next surface combatant, it would do well to learn from the mistakes made with the littoral combat ship.
The Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) has undergone a stream of criticism since its inception in 2001. Instead of slowly diminishing, the criticisms—from Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and even within the Navy—continued and grew more serious. In a February 2014 memo, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed what had been leaked in January: Instead of a planned fleet of 52 LCSs, “no new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward.” In the memo, he directed the Navy to submit proposals for alternative small surface combatants “generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.” |
| `In' analytical Note | US Naval Institute Proceedings Vol.141, No.1; Jan.2015: p.36-41 |
| Journal Source | US Naval Institute Proceedings 2015-01 141, 1 |
| Standard Number | US Navy |