| ID | 139027 |
| Title Proper | Why can’t Israel win wars any more? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Freilich , Charles D |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | National security has defined the Israeli experience for nearly seven decades. Yet, in the face of threats ranging from low-level terrorism to existential nuclear dangers, Israel has never adopted a formal national-security strategy. Founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion was the only sitting leader to develop one, and though it was never formally enshrined, the ‘Ben-Gurion doctrine’ remains Israel’s closest equivalent to a national-security strategy to this day. The defence components of that doctrine were based on three fundamental pillars, commonly known as the ‘three Ds’: deterrence of possible threats; detection, meaning early warning of impending attacks in the event that deterrence failed; and decision, meaning decisive military defeat of the enemy. In recent years, a fourth pillar has been added – defence – though it remains controversial, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have yet to fully adapt to its implications. |
| `In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 57, No.2; Apr/May 2015: p.79–92 |
| Journal Source | Surviva Vol: 57 No 2 |
| Key Words | Israel ; Military Strategy ; Hamas ; Arab Countries ; Hizbullah ; Asymmetric Threats ; Israeli Defense Forces ; National Security – Israel ; Strategic Pillar ; Military Decision ; Strategic Circumstances ; Diplomatic Freedom ; Indefatigable Opponents ; Indecisive Wars ; Israel’s Conventional Wars ; Lebanon and Gaza ; Uncooperative Targets |