ID | 140845 |
Title Proper | Responsibility to protect |
Other Title Information | the debate continues |
Language | ENG |
Author | Paris, Roland |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | Before I reply to each of the commentaries, allow me to explain why I wrote the article in the first place. Like many people, I was fascinated by the Libya intervention of 2011 and the surrounding debates, including the quite polarized assessments of the intervention's implications for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Some observers wrote that the operation was a triumph for R2P and represented its successful ‘coming of age', while others said it heralded the doctrine's demise. Both of these positions were unsatisfying, for three reasons. First, there seemed to be evidence of both success and failure in the Libya mission, which suggested that many defenders and critics of R2P were overstating their case. Second, these polarized positions deflected attention away from the ways in which elements of success and failure might be interconnected and perhaps even inseparable from each other. Finally, many of the analyses dwelt on the particular circumstances of the Libya operation without considering the underlying strategic logic of this type of mission, or the assumed relationship between the interveners’ actions and the desired outcomes. I therefore set out to examine the assumptions of preventive humanitarian intervention and to understand their relationship to R2P. |
`In' analytical Note | International Peacekeeping Vol. 22, No.3; Apr 2015: p.143-150 |
Journal Source | International Peacekeeping Vol: 22 No 3 |
Key Words | Responsibility to Protect ; R2P |