| ID | 141092 |
| Title Proper | Empowering the police |
| Other Title Information | how the Chinese communist party manages its coercive leaders |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Wang, Yuhua |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secure the loyalty of its coercive leaders, and its public security chiefs in particular, in the face of numerous domestic protests every year? This article presents the first quantitative analysis of contemporary China's coercive leaders using an original data set of provincial public security chiefs and public security funding during the reform era. I demonstrate that the CCP, owing to its concern for regime stability, has empowered the public security chiefs by incorporating them into the leadership team. Empowered public security chiefs then have stronger bargaining power over budgetary issues. I rely on fieldwork, qualitative interviews and an analysis of Party documents to complement my statistical analysis. The findings of this analysis shed light on the understanding of regime durability, contentious politics and the bureaucracy in China. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Quarterly No. 219; Sep 2014: p.625-648 |
| Journal Source | China Quarterly No 219 |
| Key Words | Chinese Communist Party ; Coercion ; Public Security Chiefs ; Leadership Team ; Public Security Funding ; Pork Barrel |