| ID | 142302 |
| Title Proper | Did Vatutin err when planning the defense of the Voronezh front while preparing for the battle of Kursk? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Valerii Nikolaevich Zamulin (translated by Stuart Britton)a* ; Zamulin, Valerii Nikolaevich ; Britton, Stuart ((tran.) |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The author Valerii Zamulin addresses a long-standing controversy concerning the Battle of Kursk: Why was the III SS Panzerkorps much more successful in the south than the Ninth Army’s offensive in the north? The author argues that Vatutin, with the approval of the Soviet high command, opted for a sensible ‘matador’s defense’ by deliberately thinning a section of his front line at the main Oboian’ highway to lure the Germans to attack there and then to weaken and stop the onrushing German ‘bull’ with armored thrusts by the 1st Tank Army and two separate tank corps, plus the 67th Army. Vatutin’s mistake was his belief that these alone would be sufficient to stop the Fourth Panzer Army’s main attack. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 28, No.4; Oct-Dec 2015: p.677-697 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol: 28 No 4 |
| Key Words | Battle of Kursk ; Vatutin Err ; Voronezh Front |