| ID | 142491 |
| Title Proper | How government coordination controlled organized crime |
| Other Title Information | the case of Mexico’s cocaine markets |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Rios, Viridiana |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article provides empirical evidence showing that when a multilevel government is well coordinated, organized crime can be more effectively controlled. Using a time-variant data set of Mexico’s cocaine markets at the subnational level and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, I show that when Mexico’s democratization decreased the probability of government coordination—the same party governing a municipality at every level of government—drug traffickers were more likely to violate the long-standing informal prohibition on selling cocaine within the country. It was this decrease in government coordination that would set the conditions for a violent war between drug cartels to erupt in the mid-2000s. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 59, No.8; Dec 2015: p.1433-1454 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict ResolutionVol: 59 No 8 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; International Security ; Internal armed Conflict ; International Institutions ; Democratization ; Democratic Institutions ; Foreign Policy Decision Making ; Foreign Policy |