| ID | 142567 |
| Title Proper | Pernicious manipulation of performance measures in China's cadre evaluation system |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gao, Jie |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Quarterly , No. 223; Sep 2015: p.618-637 |
| Journal Source | China Quarterly No 223 |
| Key Words | Typology ; Gaming ; Performance Measurement ; Cadre Management ; Target-Based Responsibility System ; Data Fabrication |