| ID | 143620 |
| Title Proper | Military power and foreign policy inaction |
| Other Title Information | Israel, 1967-1973 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Gat, Moshe |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli governments took no initiative to set a peace process in motion. Instead, they simply responded to proposals that were raised from time to time, and, for the most part, rejected all of them – the Rogers Plan, Sadat’s willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement – with the sole exception being the ceasefire agreement reached in August 1970. While Israeli policy lacked initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel’s military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, which in turn would increase the likelihood of achieving peace. Hence, Israeli leaders’ repeated requests to be supplied with advanced aircraft. |
| `In' analytical Note | Israel Affairs Vol. 22, No.1; Jan 2016: p.69-95 |
| Journal Source | Israel Affairs Vol: 22 No 1 |
| Key Words | Israel ; Egypt ; Peace Process ; Anwar Sadat ; Rogers Plan ; Meir Golda |