| ID | 144802 |
| Title Proper | National responses to transnational terrorism |
| Other Title Information | intelligence and counterterrorism provision |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Jensen, Thomas |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Intelligence about transnational terrorism is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game-theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a common transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is known by both countries, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased inefficiencies in counterterrorism provision. By extending the main model with a communication stage, I also explore whether the differences in information that may follow from national intelligence gathering will be overcome by intelligence sharing. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, then full credible intelligence sharing can happen in equilibrium. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible, then it cannot. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 60, No.3; Apr 2016: p.530-554 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 60 No 3 |
| Key Words | Intelligence ; Counterterrorism ; Transnational Terrorism ; Intelligence Sharing |