| ID | 145785 |
| Title Proper | Theorizing national preference formation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Min-hyung |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article seeks to explain through the contextualized comparisons of a few critical cases how national preferences on an interstate bargaining issue are formed domestically. It proposes an interaction framework of national preference formation (NPF), which emphasizes the government's policy autonomy, the size of the ruling party or coalition, and the party unity in aggregating divergent domestic preferences for interstate bargaining. The framework is tested against major European Community members' preference formation on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Case studies reveal that the interaction framework quite accurately describes the national preferences of Germany, Britain, and France over EMU. |
| `In' analytical Note | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 29, No.1; Mar 2016: p.290-308 |
| Journal Source | Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol: 29 No 1 |
| Key Words | Economic and Monetary Union ; National Preference Formation ; Interstate Bargaining ; NPF |