| ID | 146037 |
| Title Proper | Where we get thucydides wrong |
| Other Title Information | the fallacies of history’s first “hegemonic” war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Novo, Andrew R |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Thucydides’ History remains the basis for numerous claims within International Relations Theory, contributing to defining concepts from the security dilemma to the dynamics of bi-polarity and hegemonic transition theory. But the historical record that underpins Thucydides’ History provides a more complex view of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. This analysis argues that basing explanations for the Great Peloponnesian War on the premise of Spartan “fear” is incomplete. A bi-polar, hegemonic rivalry did not lock-in the two states; they existed in a complex multi-polar system. This multi-polarity allowed other actors—notably Corinth—to play a key role in the outbreak of war. It was consideration for alliances, empires, and political rivalries within the context of multi-polarity, rather than a prosaic Spartan “fear,” that were at the heart of the war. These unique characteristics combined with the misrepresentation of the historical record, make generalising from the Peloponnesian War dangerous. |
| `In' analytical Note | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 27, No.1; Mar 2016: p.1-21 |
| Journal Source | Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol: 27 No 1 |
| Key Words | Security Dilemma ; Hegemonic War ; International Relations ; Thucydides Wron |