| ID | 148532 |
| Title Proper | Beijing and Moscow`s grapple with pyongyang`s nuclear missile provocations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Weitz, Richard |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Beijing and Moscow pursue similar goals and policies toward the Democratic People`s Republic of Korea. They want to end North Korea`s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests, since these activities spur further proliferation, complicate China`s and Russia`s outreach toward the Republic of Korea, and strengthen the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Yet, Beijing and Moscow oppose military responses or strong sanctions since both parties fear that coercive measures could precipitate regime change in Pyongyang, which alarms them more than a nuclear-armed North Korea. Hence, Beijing and Moscow seek to wean Pyongyang off of its nuclear addiction through foreign assistance and security assurances that promote an international climate favorable toward internal reforms and improvements in North Korea`s external behavior. They argue that dialogue and negotiations leading to the denuclearizing of the Peninsula would best promote the interests of all parties in terms of regional peace and stability. Nonetheless, there are important differences between China`s and Russia`s policies. For example, Beijing has more economic tools to apply against the DPRK, while Moscow seems more open to Korean reunification, under certain conditions, as an enduring solution to the Pyongyang problem. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 28, No.4; Dec 2016: p.509-524 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 28 No 4 |
| Key Words | Nuclear ; Missile ; China ; Russia ; North Korea ; Beijing ; Moscow |