| ID | 152381 |
| Title Proper | Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia |
| Other Title Information | Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | O’Donnell, Frank |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition. |
| `In' analytical Note | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 38, No.1; Apr 2017: p.78-101 |
| Journal Source | Contemporary Security Policy Vol: 38 No 1 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; Deterrence ; India ; Pakistan ; Nuclear doctrine |