ID | 153363 |
Title Proper | Deterrence from the Ground Up |
Other Title Information | Understanding NATO’s enhanced forward presence |
Language | ENG |
Author | Zapfe, Martin |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | As a nuclear alliance, NATO’s deterrence is ultimately based on the threat of nuclear retaliation. However, Russia under President Vladimir Putin seems to have rejected the established Western playbook, opting instead for ‘cross-domain coercion’1 that transcends conventions in deterrence, most importantly the balance between conventional and nuclear forces. NATO’s answer since 2014 has been largely based on conventional adaptation mirroring similar evolutionary steps in the Alliance’s history. Important as these measures may be, there is a danger that they will fall short of enhancing allied deterrence, and may even be harmful to it, if they do not take into account the essentially political nature of the Russian threat. |
`In' analytical Note | Survival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 59, No.3; Jun-Jul 2017: p.147-160 |
Journal Source | Survival Vol: 59 No 3 |
Key Words | NATO ; Nuclear ; Deterrence ; Missiles ; Russia |